Two Threshold Questions in Every Helms-Burton Case: Who Can Sue, and How Long Do They Have
The short answer
Two appellate decisions in 2025 set the boundaries of the Title III claimant pool. The Eleventh Circuit held that a claimant must be a United States national when suit is filed, not when the property was taken, which substantially enlarges who can sue. The Second Circuit held that the statute's two-year deadline is a statute of repose that the presidential suspensions did not toll, which substantially shortens what can be sued over.
Who can sue
In López Regueiro v. American Airlines, decided July 30, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that the property owner had to be a United States national at the time of the confiscation. The statute speaks of any United States national, and once such a national acquires an interest in confiscated property the right to sue attaches regardless of when citizenship was obtained.
The practical effect is large. Cuban-born exiles who were naturalized after 1959, and their United States citizen descendants, are within the statute. That is most of the community with a claim.
The counterweight is the acquisition bar. The statute denies a right of action to anyone who acquired the claim on or after March 12, 1996. An inheritance from a family member who held the claim before that date is generally fine. A purchased or assigned claim generally is not.
How long they have
In Moreira v. Société Générale, decided January 7, 2025, the Second Circuit held that the two-year deadline is a statute of repose rather than a limitations period, and that the suspensions of Title III between 1996 and 2019 did not toll it. The statute says an action may not be brought more than two years after the trafficking giving rise to the action has ceased to occur, and the court held that language admits no exceptions.
The consequence is that trafficking which stopped more than two years before filing is not actionable, no matter how strong the claim otherwise is, and no matter that the claimant was legally forbidden to sue during much of that period.
Our take: the two rules interact, and the interaction is the advice
Taken together these decisions describe a claim that is broadly available to the right people and narrowly available in time.
That combination produces a specific and uncomfortable result. A family with an unimpeachable claim to property that a company used from 2016 to 2019 and then stopped using may have no remedy at all, because the trafficking ceased. A family with a weaker claim to property someone is using today has a live case. The strength of the underlying claim and the availability of the remedy are close to independent of each other.
Two practical consequences follow.
For claimants: the question to answer first is not whether the family owned the property. It is whether anyone is trafficking in it now, or stopped doing so within the last two years. That question is cheap to answer and it disposes of a great many potential cases before any money is spent on title research.
For defendants: the date trafficking ceased is a dispositive fact and it should be established and documented. A company that exited Cuba should be able to prove precisely when.
We note that the repose holding comes from the Second Circuit and is not binding in the Eleventh. We are aware of no Eleventh Circuit decision squarely adopting it. That is a real opening for a claimant, and it should be argued rather than conceded.
When to call a lawyer
Before assuming a claim is stale, and before assuming it is timely. The analysis turns on when the conduct stopped, which is frequently a disputed fact.
Sources
● Transnational Litigation Blog, Helms-Burton's statute of repose (February 13, 2025)
Disclaimer
This post discusses publicly reported legal developments for general informational purposes. It is not legal advice, it does not create an attorney client relationship, and it does not reflect the firm's position in any pending matter. Outcomes depend on the specific facts and the governing law of the relevant jurisdiction.