When a Franchise System Goes Into Chapter 11, There Are Three Different Problems. Most Owners Only Worry About One.

The short answer

If you are the operator, Chapter 11 in Florida does not let you keep the brand over the franchisor's objection.

If the franchisor files, you usually can keep operating, but only if you affirmatively act. Silence is not safety.

If another multi-unit operator in your system files, the practical risk is not their debt. It is who takes their stores, which leases get rejected, and whether corporate or a discount buyer lands next door.

Most owners collapse all three into one fear. They are three different problems with three different responses, and the 2026 filing wave has now produced a Florida example of each.

Who this is written for

Two groups.

Operators watching the brand. FAT Brands Inc. and its affiliates, including the Johnny Rockets, Twin Peaks and Fazoli's entities, filed Chapter 11 in the Southern District of Texas on January 26, 2026 before Judge Alfredo R. Perez, under lead case number 26-90126. The court confirmed a joint plan of liquidation on July 27, 2026, and the plan went effective on July 31, 2026.

Operators inside systems that already failed at the franchisee level. Popeyes, Applebee's, Moe's, Burger King, Carl's Jr., Hardee's, Subway, and now Wendy's. If you operate in Florida or a neighboring state under one of those marks, the 2026 cases change who your neighbor is, who collects your royalties, and whether the dark boxes in your trade area reopen as corporate stores or as a cheaper competitor.

This is written from that chair, not the debtor's.

Part I: Your franchisor files

What does not happen automatically

A franchisor bankruptcy does not cancel your franchise agreement on the petition date. The agreement is an executory contract. The debtor in possession or trustee may assume it, assume and assign it to a buyer of the brand, or reject it. Until that election is made, you generally must keep performing. Royalties, brand standards, reporting. The non-debtor franchisee is still bound.

Rejection is the scenario owners lose sleep over. It is also the one most often described incorrectly, including by people who should know better.

Rejection is a breach, not a rescission

Start with what rejection is not. Rejection of an executory contract is a breach. It does not undo the contract or claw back rights the contract already granted.

That is now settled at the Supreme Court. In Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. 370 (2019), an 8 to 1 decision written by Justice Kagan, the Court held that a debtor-licensor's rejection of a trademark license does not terminate the licensee's right to use the mark. "A debtor's rejection of an executory contract in bankruptcy has the same effect as a breach outside bankruptcy," the Court wrote. "Such an act cannot rescind rights that the contract previously granted."

For a franchisee, that is the holding that matters most, and it is the reason a rejected franchise agreement does not mean the sign comes down the next morning.

The trap in section 365(n), and why it does not do what most people think

You will read, constantly, that 11 U.S.C. section 365(n) is the franchisee's protection after rejection. Section 365(n) lets the licensee of a rejected intellectual property license elect either to treat the contract as terminated and file a rejection damages claim, or to retain its rights under the license as they existed immediately before the case and keep paying royalties.

That is a real and useful provision. It is also, for the core of a franchise, the wrong statute.

The Bankruptcy Code defines "intellectual property" at 11 U.S.C. section 101(35A), and the list is closed: trade secret; invention, process, design or plant protected under title 35; patent application; plant variety; work of authorship protected under title 17; and mask work. Trademarks, service marks and trade names appear nowhere in it. Congress left them out, and that omission is exactly what produced the circuit split the Supreme Court resolved in Mission Product.

So the trademark license at the center of your franchise agreement is not covered by section 365(n) at all. Your protection there comes from Mission Product, not from the election.

Section 365(n) still has work to do in a franchise case, and it is worth understanding where. A franchise agreement frequently licenses things that are within section 101(35A): the operations manual and training materials as works of authorship, proprietary recipes and supplier terms as trade secrets, and in some systems patented equipment or processes. As to those components, the section 365(n) election is available and should be made in writing. As to the marks, you rely on Mission Product and on your own performance.

The practical instruction is the same either way, and it is the thing franchisees get wrong. Do not go quiet. Keep paying what the agreement requires, put your position in writing, and make the section 365(n) election in writing as to any covered intellectual property. Doing nothing is how operators lose ground while a trustee sells the brand to a buyer with no interest in legacy franchisees. Do not rely on a phone call with brand counsel.

The other limit. Neither Mission Product nor section 365(n) compels a bankrupt franchisor to keep staffing field consultants, fund national advertising at the old level, or run a commissary. You keep the right to use what you licensed. You do not keep the franchisor's future performance. In a system the size of FAT Brands, the practical consequence is that the brand buyer, not the old holding company, is who you will live with, and that buyer will generally try to reset development obligations, remodel calendars and existing default files as the price of a continuing relationship.

Assignment to a new franchisor

When a brand is sold under section 363, your agreement can be assumed and assigned to the purchaser. You will be asked for a cure amount covering unpaid royalties, advertising fund contributions and audit exposure. You can object to the cure figure, to adequate assurance of future performance, and to any attempt to rewrite the bargain inside the sale order.

Read the sale order itself. Watch for language that strips franchisee defenses, or that deems every agreement assumed and assigned unless the franchisee objects by a short deadline buried in a notice.

If your agreement is rejected rather than assigned, expect the franchisor or the buyer to demand that you stop using the marks and de-identify the store. Mission Product says rejection alone does not end your license, so that demand is a position, not a self-executing result. Whether it is correct depends on your agreement and on what the sale order actually provides. This is the point at which a franchisee should have its own counsel rather than reading the brand's letter as the answer.

The first two weeks of a franchisor case

Pull every franchise agreement, development agreement, guarantee and personal guarantee. Note the governing law, the consent provisions, and any clause keyed to the franchisor's own bankruptcy. Such a clause is often unenforceable as an ipso facto provision, but it still gets used as leverage.

Calendar the sale objection and contract assumption deadlines immediately. They run faster than state court instincts expect.

Decide early whether you want to stay with the brand under a buyer. If you do, pay post-petition royalties on time. Nonpayment is the cleanest reason a buyer will have for leaving you off the assumed list.

Do not stop operating on a rumor. And do not prepay royalties to be safe without tracing where the money actually goes. In securitized structures, the entity collecting may not be the operating company you think you are paying.

Part II: You did not file. Another operator in your system did.

This is the wave that actually reached Florida in 2026. These are franchisee bankruptcies. The brand is solvent. Your exposure is contagion: closures, corporate take-backs, insider buyers, and rejected leases sitting empty in your trade area.

A note on sourcing before the numbers. Where a figure below comes from a sworn first-day declaration or a court order, this post says so. Where it comes from trade coverage, it says that too. The distinction matters, because the trade press figures in this area have been wrong often enough to be worth flagging.

Popeyes: Sailormen, Inc.

In re Sailormen, Inc., No. 26-10451, Bankr. S.D. Fla. (Miami), Chapter 11, filed January 15, 2026 before Judge Robert A. Mark. A Miami-based Popeyes operator.

The first-day declaration states the operating facts: 136 Popeyes restaurants in Florida and Georgia, 3,306 employees, fiscal 2025 net sales of $233,458,379, and a net operating loss of $18,769,243. Secured debt was roughly $130 million owed to lenders for whom BMO Bank N.A. serves as administrative agent. That $130 million figure is the secured piece, not the whole balance sheet: the declaration puts total liabilities near $342.6 million against assets near $232.5 million.

The auction was held on June 15, 2026, and the court entered five separate sale orders on June 23, 2026. One of them is worth reading closely if you operate in South Florida: the court approved a sale to Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen, Inc. itself, of sixteen restaurants in the Miami market, for a gross purchase price of $9,600,000. That one is a court record, not a rumor.

The other buyers were The Pulse Restaurant Group, 61 Biscuits, LLC, SBH Foods and RFI Ventures. Trade coverage reports that roughly 97 restaurants sold in total, that Pulse took about 50 stores across Tampa, Jacksonville, Tallahassee and Pensacola for roughly $2.69 million, that 61 Biscuits took a small West Palm Beach package for roughly $1.1 million, and that SBH Foods took Savannah and later Orlando stores. Those allocations are trade press. The buyers and the sale orders are the court record.

The RFI Ventures purchase collapsed, and the fight over it is live. The estate commenced Sailormen, Inc. v. RFI Ventures, LLC, Adv. No. 26-01315, on September 9, 2026, and moved for summary judgment on September 17, 2026. Nothing has been decided.

What happened to the stores nobody bought is the part that reshapes trade areas. The declaration record shows 136 restaurants at the petition and 17 already closed by April 30, 2026, leaving 119 going into the auction. On June 19, 2026 the estate moved on an expedited basis to reject the unbid and master leases effective June 30, 2026, stating plainly that as of July 1 it would no longer have authority to use cash collateral to operate those stores. The rejection exhibit includes Jacksonville, Pensacola, Gainesville, St. Petersburg, Bradenton, and Cairo and Brunswick in Georgia.

If you are a remaining Popeyes franchisee in Florida. Corporate now operates sixteen former Sailormen units in Miami under a court-approved sale. That is an encroachment fact, and Item 17 plus whatever protected territory language exists in your agreement is what governs when corporate sets hours, pricing and promotional cadence from those stores. A buyer who acquired stores at a distressed price does not carry your cost basis. Rejected leases are not permanently dark; they return to landlords who will re-let them, sometimes to a competing brand and sometimes back into Popeyes. And do not treat the debtor's accommodations as precedent for your own file.

Moe's: Quality Fresca I, LLC

In re Quality Fresca I, LLC, No. 26-20345, Bankr. S.D. Fla. (West Palm Beach), Chapter 11, filed August 4, 2026 before Judge Erik P. Kimball.

The chief restructuring officer's declaration, filed the same day, is unusually clear. The debtor acquired 67 Moe's locations across Florida, South Carolina, Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia on or about March 9, 2020, and two more Florida units in August 2021, for 69. It closed 19 through the end of 2025 and 12 since, leaving 38 operating at filing. Fiscal 2025 net sales were $58,941,831 against negative EBITDA of $111,204. Year to date through June 15, 2026, revenue was $26,382,413 with EBITDA of $315,254. As of December 31, 2025, assets were roughly $44 million against liabilities of roughly $52 million.

The secured lender is GR Loanco 1 LLC, an affiliate of the debtor's ultimate parent, which purchased the existing PNC credit agreement in May 2026. Aggregate secured exposure is roughly $16 million. Trade payables are approximately $2.1 million, with franchisor royalty and advertising claims acknowledged but not quantified in the record.

The date other Moe's operators should note is not the petition date. It is the default. On August 5, 2025, the franchisor, Moe's Franchisor SPV LLC, an affiliate of GoTo Foods, notified the debtor that it was in default under all of its franchise agreements. A month later the parties entered Multi-Unit Addendum No. 1, under which the franchisor deferred amounts owed. That was a forbearance, not a second default. The debtor complied and the addendum expired on its own terms. The Chapter 11 came a year after the default letter.

On the petition date the debtor moved on an emergency basis to reject sixteen leases, fourteen of them in Florida, effective as of the petition date. Final first-day orders were entered September 4, 2026; the case remains open with no plan on file.

If you are a remaining Moe's franchisee. The system-wide default letter is how Item 17 actually operates when a large operator slips, and it arrived a full year before anyone filed anything. Fourteen Florida closures redraw trade areas, and landlords in those centers will re-tenant. Affiliate debtor in possession financing also means the parent may end up owning what survives, so the question worth asking is who your neighbor will be after confirmation.

Applebee's: Neighborhood Restaurant Partners Florida

In re NRPF Group Two, LLC, No. 26-53945, Bankr. N.D. Ga., Chapter 11, filed March 24, 2026 before Judge Sage M. Sigler, with the affiliated Neighborhood Restaurant Partners Florida entities at No. 26-53946.

The chief restructuring officer's declaration states that the debtors closed nine restaurants in fiscal 2025 and five more in the first quarter of 2026, leaving 53 operating across Florida, Georgia and Alabama with roughly 2,000 employees and independent contractors. Equity Bank is the secured lender.

The prepetition sale process is the detail worth keeping. An investment bank ran it beginning in March 2025 for four to five months and contacted more than 83 groups, of which 17 showed some form of initial interest. In February 2026 the debtors reached a tentative agreement in principle with an affiliate of the franchisor, a subsidiary of Dine Brands Global, Inc., to acquire roughly 53 restaurants, but the out-of-court structure could not be finalized with the secured lender before the petition date.

A settlement with Equity Bank was approved in late May 2026, clearing the path for a sale to the brand. Trade coverage reports the split as $1.05 million allowed secured and $12.57 million unsecured.

What has not been established is that the sale closed. The court's own memorandum opinion of June 12, 2026 still described the transaction prospectively. No closing notice, plan or dismissal appears on the docket, and the case remains open with monthly operating reports running into September 2026. Anyone telling you the franchisor already owns those restaurants is ahead of the record.

If you are a remaining Applebee's franchisee in Florida. A franchisor absorbing fifty-plus boxes is precisely the encroachment scenario Item 17 describes and generally does not protect against. Pricing, staffing and remodel capital at those stores get set at the brand, not by a peer operator. Reported Florida closures run through Casselberry, Celebration, Daytona Beach, Kissimmee, two Orlando sites, Ormond Beach, Panama City and Panama City Beach, which changes your competitive set even while the dining rooms stay dark. And the failed out-of-court process is the lesson for anyone who may someday be the distressed seller: eighty-three contacts and seventeen interested parties is not a deal.

Burger King: Consolidated Burger Holdings

In re Consolidated Burger Holdings, LLC, No. 25-40162, Bankr. N.D. Fla. (Tallahassee), Chapter 11, filed April 14, 2025, jointly administered with Consolidated Burger A, LLC (No. 25-40160) and Consolidated Burger B, LLC (No. 25-40161).

The declaration describes 57 Burger King restaurants in Florida and southern Georgia, roughly $179,000 of unrestricted cash at filing, and total prepetition debt of about $36.6 million, of which roughly $28.8 million was funded debt. The only secured debt was an Auxilior facility of about $14 million.

The sequence that ended this operator is the part worth memorizing. Burger King sued the debtors and a principal in the Southern District of Florida in January 2024; the parties settled that September. Then, on February 20, 2025, the franchisor declared defaults under all of the franchise agreements and forbore only through April 14, 2025 at 5:00 p.m. The Chapter 11 petition was filed the same day the forbearance expired.

A section 363 sale followed in June 2025, under three separate sale orders, with the assets going to four purchasers rather than a single brand-side buyer. Debtor in possession financing of $1.6 million came from Auxilior, the prepetition secured lender, not from the brand. Operations ceased in late June 2025.

The ending is unusual enough to state precisely. The debtors moved to dismiss in May 2026, and the court entered an order of dismissal on July 31, 2026; the clerk closed the cases in mid-August. There was no confirmed plan and no conversion. A dismissal after a completed 363 sale is a real outcome, and it is not the one most operators picture when they hear "Chapter 11."

If you are a remaining Burger King franchisee in Florida. A mandated remodel calendar and an image default are not brand standards you can negotiate later. Here the franchisor's system-wide default declaration, and a forbearance that ran out to the hour, are what put the operator into court. After a 363 sale, the buyers' remodel and hours obligations are frequently reset in the sale documents, which can put refreshed, well-capitalized stores directly next to operators still carrying the old image.

Wendy's: Meritage Hospitality Group

In re Meritage Hospitality Group Inc., No. 26-02947, Bankr. W.D. Mich., Chapter 11, filed September 17, 2026, reassigned to Judge James W. Boyd the same day, with fourteen affiliated debtors. Joint administration has been requested but not yet ordered.

This is a national case, not a Florida one, and it is one day old as this is written, which limits what can responsibly be said about it.

What the record shows: fifteen Chapter 11 petitions, an estimated asset range and an estimated liability range each checked on the petition form at $10,000,001 to $50 million, and schedules not due until October 1, 2026. Those checkbox ranges are estimates on a pre-printed form and do not reconcile with the reported secured facility, so do not treat them as the company's balance sheet. The court also entered a notice of defective filing on the petition itself.

From the company's own announcement and its second quarter release: 314 Wendy's restaurants, one Bojangles and five independently branded restaurants; roughly 9,000 employees across fifteen states; roughly 60 Wendy's already closed; second quarter 2026 sales of $150.0 million against $163.5 million a year earlier, with a net loss of $13.6 million including one-time restructuring and closing costs. Store-level EBITDA of $36.2 million, down 48 percent, is a fiscal 2025 figure, not a 2026 one. Trade coverage reports a $150 million facility with City National Bank, a default notice in September 2025 and a franchisor default notice in October 2025.

On the brand side, Wendy's reported U.S. same-restaurant sales down 7.0 percent in the second quarter of 2026, and net closures of 245 restaurants in the U.S. system in the first half of 2026, against 44 openings and 289 closings.

As of this writing there has been no first-day hearing, and no debtor in possession financing motion appears on the docket.The company says it is pursuing financing. Nothing has been approved.

If you are a Wendy's franchisee, including in Florida. This is not your bankruptcy, but it is the largest operator-side shock the brand has absorbed this year. Expect corporate or third-party takeovers of closed Meritage boxes and pressure on remaining operators to absorb development the system just lost. Watch, too, whether the brand uses the moment to accelerate defaults against otheroperators who are behind on royalties or image. Large operator filings tend to tighten enforcement everywhere else.

Other 2026 filings that can still reach your trade area

Carl's Jr. Friendly Franchisees Corporation and its subsidiaries filed Chapter 11 in the Central District of California on April 2, 2026 before Judge Scott C. Clarkson, with the affiliated cases administered under Sun Gir Incorporated, No. 8:26-bk-11056. Trade coverage reports roughly 65 California units, 49 of them offered for sale, and management attributing the distress in part to California's $20 fast-food minimum wage. Not a Florida matter, but a preview of the labor-cost narrative brands will recycle.

Hardee's, twice. ARC Burger, LLC, No. 26-55202, Bankr. N.D. Ga., filed Chapter 7 on April 20, 2026 after closing its 77 stores in December 2025. The franchisor had terminated the franchise agreements in September 2025, terminated the operator's authority in December, and sued in the Middle District of Tennessee in November 2025 seeking more than $6.5 million in unpaid royalties, rent and advertising contributions. A second Hardee's operator, Superior Star, LLC, No. 26-31809, Bankr. W.D. Ky., filed Chapter 11 on July 9, 2026 and is litigating against StarCorp LLC, the seller it bought its units from, not the franchisor, in adversary proceedings in Kentucky and Arizona that remain pending.

Subway. MTF Enterprises, LLC, No. 26-10237, and MTF Holdings, LLC, No. 26-10236, Bankr. E.D. Pa., Chapter 11, filed January 21, 2026. Roughly 43 stores. The filing itself identifies "weekly and daily payments drawn by the MCA lenders" as the primary cause of the financial problems. If a fellow operator in your state is on merchant cash advance financing, that is frequently the last chapter before the stores go dark or get re-franchised near you.

Part III: If you are the distressed multi-unit franchisee in Florida

The 2026 files also show what not to expect from your own Chapter 11.

Section 365(c)(1) bars a debtor in possession from assuming an executory contract where, first, applicable non-bankruptcy law excuses the counterparty from accepting performance from an entity other than the debtor, and second, the counterparty does not consent. The Eleventh Circuit framed that first condition as a hypothetical question in In re James Cable Partners, L.P., 27 F.3d 534 (11th Cir. 1994), aligning it with the Third Circuit's hypothetical test and against the actual test used in the First and Fifth Circuits.

Read James Cable carefully before assuming it decides your problem, because it cuts both ways. The Eleventh Circuit allowedassumption there. Its holding was that a general contractual prohibition on assignment is not "applicable law" within the meaning of section 365(c)(1). To be excused, the counterparty must point to non-bankruptcy law that makes the performance nondelegable, the classic example being a personal services contract. A no-assignment clause in your franchise agreement, standing alone, is not enough.

What supplies the applicable law in a franchise case is the trademark license, and there is now a decision applying exactly that reasoning to a franchisee. In In re Pinnacle Foods of California, LLC, No. 24-11015 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2024), a six-unit Popeyes franchisee sought to assume its franchise agreements. It was not trying to assign them to anyone. The court held that Popeyes could block assumption anyway, because applicable law, in the form of the non-assignability of trademark licenses and the state franchise relations statute, would excuse the franchisor from accepting performance from a hypothetical assignee. The court acknowledged that the rule "often has devastating effects on the ability of Chapter 11 debtors to reorganize."

Pinnacle Foods is an Eastern District of California case, so it binds nobody in Florida, and the Ninth Circuit rather than the Eleventh supplies its framework. But the reasoning is the reasoning a Florida franchisee should expect to meet, and the outcome is the one to plan around: no consent, no assumption. Note the asymmetry with Part I as well. Trademark law is strong enough to block a franchisee from assuming its own agreements, while the Bankruptcy Code's definition of intellectual property is narrow enough to leave trademarks out of section 365(n) entirely. Franchisees end up on the wrong side of both.

The practical consequence is that a Florida franchisee filing is usually one of three things: a section 363 sale of stores the brand will approve, a lease-rejection-and-shrink case, or a brand take-back. It is not a standalone plan that keeps the same owner in the same agreements over a franchisor's "no."

Cure of royalties, advertising fund, audits and often remodel and image defaults is the price of any consent. An insider buyer still has to be approved as a new franchisee. Cash collateral drop-dead dates, not plan confirmation, are when unsold stores actually go dark, as the Sailormen leases showed at the end of June. And merchant cash advance financing can make Chapter 11 too late to matter.

Do not file on the theory that bankruptcy freezes Item 17. The automatic stay freezes collection. It does not write the franchisor's consent for you.

Part IV: A practical checklist

The brand looks unsteady

Inventory every license grant, guaranteed obligation and supply contract, and separate the trademark license from the operations manual, trade secrets and any patented equipment, because they are governed by different rules. Prepare a section 365(n) election letter as to the covered intellectual property now, and send it if rejection is noticed. Put your Mission Product position in writing as to the marks. Object to cure amounts and to sale orders that treat your agreement as assumed and assigned without a real adequate assurance showing. Keep paying post-petition royalties if you intend to stay, and stop only on advice and with a paper trail.

A peer operator in your brand files

Map every store they operate inside your trade area and every store already closed. Read your territorial, encroachment and right-of-first-refusal language before corporate or a distressed buyer takes those boxes. Expect the franchisor to tighten transfers and defaults system-wide after a large filing. If a rejected location sits in your center or across the street, talk to the landlord early, because you may want that real estate more than a new competing franchisee does. And do not copy the debtor's pricing or its unpaid-royalty posture. Its estate is playing a different game than you are.

You are the one slipping

Treat a system-wide default letter as the opening of a sale process, not a negotiation that can wait a year. Both Quality Fresca and Consolidated Burger received one well before they filed. Remodel and image mandates are default events, not suggestions. Get a transfer package in front of the franchisor while you still have a going concern, because bankruptcy does not improve their underwriting of your buyer. And stay off merchant cash advance financing if there is any path to an orderly transfer.

The point

The story is not that restaurants are dying. It is narrower and more useful than that. Franchise agreements in this circuit move only with the franchisor's consent. Rejected leases redraw trade areas whether or not you were a party to anything. And a franchisor bankruptcy is survivable, because rejection is a breach and not a rescission, but only if the franchisee acts on that in writing and then makes its peace with whoever bought the brand.

Sources

Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. 370 (2019).

In re James Cable Partners, L.P., 27 F.3d 534 (11th Cir. 1994).

In re Pinnacle Foods of California, LLC, No. 24-11015 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2024).

11 U.S.C. sections 101(35A), 365(a), 365(c), 365(f) and 365(n).

In re Sailormen, Inc., No. 26-10451, Bankr. S.D. Fla. (Chapter 11, filed Jan. 15, 2026); Sailormen, Inc. v. RFI Ventures, LLC, Adv. No. 26-01315 (filed Sept. 9, 2026).

In re Quality Fresca I, LLC, No. 26-20345, Bankr. S.D. Fla. (Chapter 11, filed Aug. 4, 2026).

In re NRPF Group Two, LLC, No. 26-53945, and In re Neighborhood Restaurant Partners Florida, LLC, No. 26-53946, Bankr. N.D. Ga. (Chapter 11, filed Mar. 24, 2026).

In re Consolidated Burger Holdings, LLC, No. 25-40162, Bankr. N.D. Fla. (Chapter 11, filed Apr. 14, 2025), jointly administered with Nos. 25-40160 and 25-40161.

In re Meritage Hospitality Group Inc., No. 26-02947, Bankr. W.D. Mich. (Chapter 11, filed Sept. 17, 2026).

In re FAT Brands Inc., No. 26-90126, Bankr. S.D. Tex. (Chapter 11, filed Jan. 26, 2026; plan confirmed July 27, 2026, effective July 31, 2026).

In re Sun Gir Inc., No. 8:26-bk-11056, Bankr. C.D. Cal. (Chapter 11, filed Apr. 2, 2026); In re ARC Burger, LLC, No. 26-55202, Bankr. N.D. Ga. (Chapter 7, filed Apr. 20, 2026); In re Superior Star, LLC, No. 26-31809, Bankr. W.D. Ky. (Chapter 11, filed July 9, 2026); In re MTF Enterprises, LLC, No. 26-10237, Bankr. E.D. Pa. (Chapter 11, filed Jan. 21, 2026).

Disclaimer

This post discusses publicly reported legal developments for general informational purposes. It is not legal advice, it does not create an attorney client relationship, and it does not reflect the firm's position in any pending matter. Outcomes depend on the specific facts and the governing law of the relevant jurisdiction.